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Abstract Fresh and clean water is one of the scarcest and most vital resources to humankind. Agriculture is the largest global water user. Irrigation managers must orchestrate water use at the catchment
scale, balancing the management of supply and demand and taking into account the benefits from
water use, its distribution among water users and environmental concerns. We present results from
the integrated modeling of irrigation water use at catchment scale. An extended hydrological runoff
model WaSiM-ETH that depicts inefficient surface irrigation was integrated with and coupled to a
parametric model for irrigation water distribution, which is linked to the bio-economic multi-agent
model M P -M AS that represents farmers as water users. Models were calibrated empirically, first as
standalone models and then with increasing complexity of interactions. The integration of process
across such long chain of reasoning resulted in an improved system understanding along disciplinary
boundaries. The case study presented is irrigation water use within the Chilean Region of Maule.
We analyze how farmers whose endowment with formal water rights is insufficient may depend on
spillover water, and specifically the distribution of benefits from improvements in canal conductive
efficiency across the farming community.
Keywords: Watershed management; Irrigation; Agent-based model; Integrated Modeling of Feedback
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1.1

I NTRODUCTION
Formal and informal access to water in Chile

Since the 1990s, Chile has become a model for successful free market economies, pairing a strong specialization into few competitive commodities and raw materials, with strong government that proactively supports its producers. With its unique location in the southern hemisphere, export agriculture
for Northern markets has experienced rapid and sustained growth. The agricultural sector and its
focus on high-quality products generates impressive revenues for producers, processors and traders
and contributes significant resources to the government budget. Moreover, it absorbs unqualified and
skilled labour and gives the nation a positive image. However, with increasingly modern production
systems on one side and the remaining traditional systems, Chile’s income disparity has became one
of the most extreme in the world and equitable access to productive resources is a core development
objective [Lopez and Anriquez, 2007].
In Chile, water management has always been linked to agricultural development policies, because
most of Chile’s agriculture relies on irrigation during the core growing season, December to February.
The Water Code, the legal foundation for access to water, has evolved dynamically under different
political climates. In 1981, the socialist code of 1973 was reformed and a totally market-oriented
policy was adopted. This Water Code defined water as a ‘public property for private use’ and defines
water rights as a water equivalent, defined in liters/second. Entitlements to surface water are separated
from land ownership and can be traded freely and transferred to other uses, once they are inscribed
(‘legalized’) with the Direccion General de Aguas. The long-term impacts of this Water Code are the
subject of national and international debate [Bauer, 2005].
Today, many farmers have not yet fully legalized their water rights with the government. This process
is costly and paper works consume time and require good literacy. Nationally, Hearne and Donoso
[2005] estimate that 10 to 50 percent of all rights are still not legalized and remain ‘customary’.
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Though protected by law [Donoso, 2006], neither is the quantitative value of such customary rights
precisely defined, nor if flows may be used continuously or discontinuously [JdV Longavi, 2005].
Due to the volatility of river flows, available water can be less than the amount that right holders are
entitled to. In such years, most user organizations interpret water rights ‘traditionally’ as percentages
of river flows [Hearne and Donoso, 2005] and every right holder suffers equally from a proportional
reduction of water delivery.
The Water rights of all farmers are managed by water user organisations (Juntas de Vigilancia), which
ensure that all farmers receive their water. These user-based organisations are also responsible for the
maintenance and improvement of the canal conductive system. Mandated by their members, they can
also apply for government support for projects that improve the infrastructure of the water conduction
system. Such work includes the maintenance, repair and extension of canals, aqueducts, distribution
devices and inlets, water gages etc.
1.2

The Model Use Case

The Maule Region is located between Santiago and Concepcion. This area is dominated by the production of apples, pears, berries, vegetables, rice, corn and wheat, and pastures. During the hot and dry
summers, temperatures often exceed 30◦ C and precipitation is as low as 4mm/month, so all summer
crops and even pastures require irrigation. Winters are temperate and wet (200 mm/month). Irrigation
water is taken from rivers that originate in the Andean mountains, which are fed by precipitation and
snow melt that starts with the spring thaw in August and lasts well into January.
To study benefits from water use of heterogeneous farmers, Berger [2001] developed a bioeconomic
multi-agent model. This model M P -M AS uses on Mixed Integer Linear Programming, a method established in agricultural economics for farm-level production analysis, and for developing optimal
production plans under constrained asset endowments [Hazell and Norton, 1986]. This model estimates incomes and crop yields under water deficit, recursively updating farmers’ asset endowment.
With a simulation that uses a statistical representation of every farmer in the study region, Berger used
a diffusion of innovation model to demonstrate the impact of Chile’s integration into the MercoSur
on different farm strata [Berger, 2001]. For the 2001 model, water rights registries were not available and the essential production input ‘water rights’ was quasi-randomly attributed to farmers. As a
calibration benchmark, land use and census data (VI Censo Nacional Agropecuario 1997, INE) were
used [Berger, 2001].
Within the project Integrating Governance and Modeling and as part of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water & Food, Berger et al. [2007] conceptualized how deep integration of economic and
hydrological science can generate new insights, extending the crop yield module and a hydrological bucket model that are already implemented in the M P -M AS software. A (semi)empirical model
system was built that integrates the watershed-scale distributed hydrological model WA S I M-ETH
[Schulla and Jasper, 2007] with an intermediate bucket model that parameterizes the distribution of
water from rivers, to canal sectors, to individual farmers. Ultimately, the bioeconomic, agent-based
farm model M P -M AS is used for an economic analysis of agricultural water use. These models were
integrated conceptually and specific components were added that link the cause-effect chains. The
value added with a multi-agent model is the simulation of an additional interaction layer, the interactions between a heterogeneous population of farmers. The example elaborated in this paper is
spillover water and its relevance for farmer’s access to water.
The intermediate and parametric bucket model pools water associated with the same delivery canals
(called irrigation sector), handles canal conductive efficiency, agent-agent interactions such as return
flows from inefficient irrigation, spillover water and surplus water that farmers abandon and finally
leakage between canals and irrigation sectors (together subsumed as ‘non-attributed water’). Each
irrigation sector j is characterized by its total water delivery as a total of all water rights, its canal
conductive efficiency ηj , the irrigation efficiency that is averaged over all fields pertaining to this
sector, and the portions of water flows that remain in the pool of spillover water or are lost to other
compartments (deep percolation or seepage into other sectors).
Technically, model components were first created as standalone software, to facilitate calibration by
disciplinary experts. Interaction variables remained boundary conditions. Then, more complex model
setups were created that internalize interactions within a hierarchical coupling scheme [Arnold, 2008].
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This paper exemplifies the analysis of a single interaction component in a longer cause-effect chain,
as a step toward more integrated system understanding.
Not having room to thoroughly introduce all models, only a few relevant processes are explained here.
The multi-agent model represents farmers who transform inputs (land, water, fertilizer, seeds) with
the help of investment goods (machinery, irrigation equipment, horses, etc.) into farm produce (crops,
dairy products or meat). A range of production technologies are parameterized and may or may not be
available to the farmer. As a rational actor, the farmer produces with the objective of maximizing his
income, making optimal use of his limited or costly resources. Farmers make an annual production
decision that is based on expectations of future markets and hydro-meteorological conditions. On a
longer time scale, farmers may purchase investment goods or participate in land markets. Liquidity
may be met through short- or longterm credits at the externally determined interest rate.
A wide range of empirical data was collected to parameterize the extended model, including two
full agricultural censuses [INE 1997, 2007] with detailed data on land use, farming and irrigation
technologies and crops [Troost, 2009], market prices, local crop parameters and hydro-meteorological
time series, and complete land- and water right registries that were compiled with local water user
organisations [Uribe et al., 2009]. The maximum obtainable yield of each production technology
is parameterized. If plant water demands are not met, then yields are reduced using the CropWAT
approach [Allen et al., 1998].
Within the larger research project, we were asked to assess the impact of investments into canal
efficiency on the population of farmers, and how the existing governmental support program could be
improved. The relevant cause-effect chain starts with the annual fluctuation of river flows (the source
of irrigation water). River organisations distribute this water into a vast canal system, managed by a
second layer of user organisations. Farmers receive irrigation water for cropping and the generation of
income. However, the pool of ‘non-attributed’ water is an additional open access resource, as positive
externality resulting from spills. This pool also includes a part of canal losses. Finally, farmers can
collectively decide to improve the canal conductive system. This collective action feeds back on how
much water each farmer receives.
This paper describes two processes: the creation, use and relevance of this pool of ‘non-attributed’
water, as an interaction between farmers that results in a cascade of farm-to-farm interactions. By
comparing with-and-without scenarios, we illustrate how an improvement of canal conductive efficiency would impact on the amount of water that each individual farmers receives, in order to understand why user groups would engage into collective action and seek government support for canal
improvements.
Data on impacts from canal improvements are not available and the current canal conductive efficiency
was estimated through a farm survey. Depending on the irrigation sector, efficiency ranges from 0.5
to 0.9 of the original water delivery and is 0.65 for the largest and most representative sector that is
used for illustration purposes.
2

A N INTERMEDIATE MODEL FOR ‘ NON - ATTRIBUTED ’ WATER AND ITS USE

With improved and more detailed registry data for both land and water [Uribe et al., 2009], we were
confronted with a paradox: only 2301 out of the 3594 agents own water rights, and several of these
own far less water than required to crop their land. For January of a representative and a dry year, the
average water endowment was computed per hectare and farmers are counted for each farm size stratum (Table 1). Assuming a typical crop irrigation requirement for one hectare of 0.5 - 1 liters/second,
only about 29% of all farmers have an adequate endowment of water rights in a normal year (23% in
a moderately dry year). How do those without adequate water rights operate their farms?
Observing this phenomenon, Donoso [2006] mentions ‘surplus’ water that is taken from rivers and
abandoned by their owners. Owners are believed to leave this surplus water in the canals once the
irrigation demands of their crops are met. Other farmers, without rights, benefit from this pool of
spillover water. Other sources of spillover water are inefficiencies of the canals and on-field irrigation methods. Experts acknowledge the abundance of spillover water in most years and describe the
difficulty of enforcing the modest maintenance fees that are attached to legalized water rights in the
presence of this free resource. Only in years with stronger droughts does this pool of spillover water

Arnold et al. /Integrated Modeling of Access to Water

Water Endowment group
(liter/second per hectare)

Specialized small farm
[3.5 - 5 ha]

Small farm
[ 5 - 25 ha]

Medium farm
[ 25 - 60 ha]

Large farm
[ 60 - 200 ha]

absolute

percent

184
4/6
13 / 16
10 / 12
24 / 24
46 / 39

943
173 / 212
238 / 305
422 / 463
522 / 434
266 / 207

126
63 / 86
108 / 132
133 / 142
128 / 92
35 / 15

40
33 / 45
33 / 27
27 / 28
14 / 10
9/6

1293
273 / 349
392 / 480
592 / 645
688 / 560
356 / 267

36%
8% / 10%
11% / 13%
16% / 18%
19% / 16%
10% / 7%

281

2564

593

156

3594

100%

0
> 0 - 0.1
> 0.1 - 0.25
> 0.25 - 0.5
> 0.5 - 1
>1
Total

Table 1: Number of farmers and their level of water endowment, expressed in water right equivalents
per hectare, given for normal/moderately dry years. With changing water availability, farmers shift
between categories.
dry out, leading to aggressive and sometimes violent conflicts over water access. For such an informal
resource, empirical data is non-existent. Due to its enormous importance for farmers, any economic
production analysis must take it into account.
Types of non-attributed water. Parts of the drainage from inefficient irrigation fields returns to the
canal system. This return flow may be re-used by other irrigators downstream from the canal. The
water that returns from fields into main canals and the river system is called return flows RFj to one
sector j.
The surplus water, Si , of one agent, i, creates is the water received from legalized rights, Li , but not
used because plant irrigation demand, Di , is satisfied. The model (Berger 2001) was extended so that
surplus water is first accumulated for each sector j and then a share βc of it is re-distributed to all farms
within that sector (informal arrangements that give preferential access to some are thus ignored):
X
X
Sj =
Si = βc ·
Li − Di
i∈j

i∈j

A third source of non-attributed water stems from canal losses due to low conductive efficiency
ηc . A part of distribution losses within the canal system are added to the pool of spillover water (e.g. along cracks, weirs and junctions). This use share βc of these losses remains within the
same sector,
P P while the rest is lost to groundwater or downstream sectors. The total amount of water
Tj = r i∈j Qr WRri that is delivered to an irrigation sector j aggregates the water rights WRi of
all its farmers i and on the river flow Qr .
Cj = βc · (1 − ηc ) Tj

(1)

Access to non-attributed water. Total water delivery Ti to each agent iPcombines access to legalized sources Li = ηc r WRri Qr from water
rights and access to the pool of non-attributed (or
informally managed) water. To describe the usage
of canal losses, a flexible function f was tested
with a broad range of parameterizations, the most
general one of which is presented here. Two options exist to re-partition non-attributed water to
farmers:
(1) Each farmer receives water proportional to his
share of water rights, as a factor that averages out
reuse within each sector. This can be interpreted
as institutional allocation: water managers know
that canals are inefficient but also know that losses
re-appear downstream. Thus, each farmer receives

Figure 1: Redistribution effect of f λc , which benefits
small farmers increasingly with larger λ (normalized
to 1 ha; model only permits farms > 3.5 ha).
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more than the canals actually deliver, hoping that with reuse, every right holder can benefit.
Such ‘institutionalized reuse’ increases effective water use efficiency, but does not re-distribute water
endowments to those who lack these.
P r
r
r Q WRi
f WR = P P
(2)
r
r
r
i Q WRi
(2) To test re-distribution based on farm size, a ‘root’-function relates farm area to the benefits from
non-attributed water. For large λc , small farms receive over proportionally (1)
f λc = P

λc

i∈j

Ai

· (Ai )1/λc

(3)

For the final model, an equal mix of both modes provided a robust pattern of results. Different
parametrization of return flows and institutionalized reuse had only minor re-distributional impact
between different farmer groups. For reasons of consistency with the original model, farmers access
return flows and surplus water according to their area share within their irrigation sector1 :
Ti = Li +

f WR + f λc
· Cj
2

+P

Ai

i∈j

Ai

· (Sj + RFj )

For model evaluation, results
P were first analyzed for total flowPquantities, such as time series of total
legalized water supply i Li and total non-attributed water j (RFj + Sj + Cj ). As a reference
scenario, canal efficiency was decreased by 10 percent, to estimate the impact of canal improvement
ex-post. This reference scenario was tested with ten different canal model parameterizations, to capture the structural uncertainty embedded in model assumptions. The policy scenario then uses the
actual canal efficiency data, with the same ten structural model variations. Taking reference and policy scenario of the identical structural model variation, the performance of each individual agent was
compared under both scenarios. Indices ranged from the share of expected water supply actually met,
over the ratio of expected yields actually harvested, actual revenues and the ratio of planned and actual
income. Finally, agents were grouped according to farm size stratum and according to the percentage
of plant irrigation water demand that they can satisfy through legalized water rights.
3

R ESULTS

To model agricultural land use consistently with empirical data from both land cadastres and water
rights registries, an additional process, e.g. the suggested mechanism with non-attributed water, must
be taken into consideration. Only such a redistributive process makes agriculture physically feasible
and economically viable for a sufficient number of farm agents. With this mechanism, only 322 agents
quit farming over the study period (1996-2006). Without considering this water and while using the
best water right registry data, about 2100 agents immediately quit farming.
To demonstrate the interplay of non-attributed and legalized sources of irrigation water under interannual variation of water availability, results from the calibrated model are decomposed for two cropping cycles: the hydro-meteorologically normal or typical season 1997/8 and a moderate drought
season 1998/9 (Figure 2(a)). During the latter year, extension services report intense and sometimes
violent conflicts amongst farmers over access to water. In following years, official records show an
increased investment into irrigation equipment [CNR data, internal]. Irrigation water availability is
plotted over time, for the total legalized water supply and for the pool of non-attributed water that is
available, and also the sum of both as a total (full line). Note that in off-season, when none of the
available water is used, much of the legalized water is counted twice because it becomes available
again as non-attributed surplus water. Furthermore, flow quantities that farmers expect during their
crop planning decision is plotted (dotted line). In the normal year, expected modeled flows and ‘real’
modeled flows coincide closely. In a dry year, agents strongly overestimate supply. Finally, irrigation water demand for both seasons is fairly similar (slashed line), peaking in December. While this
demand is easily covered in the normal year, the water shortage during the dry year is significant.
1 The

original model also re-distributed inefficiencies, using a reuse factor that was applied to the legalized water endowments
(Ti = Li /uj ). Such factor-based approach levels out different inefficiencies within the sector, redistributing from the less
efficient to the more efficient. However, this mechanism did not provide water to farmers without rights.
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(a) Absolut flow quantities

(b) Flow quantities as percentage of farmers’ expectations

Figure 2: Model output depicts the total delivery of legalized water and the pool of non-attributed water over a normal and a dry cropping season. Furthermore, modeled ‘real’ water delivery is compared
with the delivery that farm agents expect during crop planning.
The ratio of total actual flows to farmer’s expectations on total flows drops from 100% in a normal
year to a meager 15%, which is even lower than the ratio of irrigation demand that can be satisfied
(Figure 2(b)). Specifically, the ratio between non-attributed water and total water almost drops to
zero, because farmers use up most of their entitlements and do not replenish the common pool. This
highlights the increased vulnerability of those farmers who rely primarily on the spillover.
The impact of canal efficiency improvements is directly linked to the pool of non-attributed water
and how users can access it. Canal improvements increase efficiency ηc and thus always increase the
supply of legalized water Li . Water right owners can either use this additional supply to increase their
irrigated area, irrigate more or abandon the additional water for the use of others. However, canal
improvements also reduce the share of canal losses that provided spillover water.
For a use portion βc = 0.3 and a moderate redistributive parameter λc = 2.5, individual impacts on
farmers are evaluated. For illustrative purposes, farmers were assigned to 20 groups, according to their
farm size stratum (sub figures in Figure 3) and according to the share of water they meet from water
rights (lines). For each of the 3500 farmer agents, differences between the reference and the policy
scenario were computed. Then a Gaussian distribution function was fitted for each group and and its
area was normalized to one for each stratum. This was done for two years, a normal one (solid lines)
and a dry year (dotted lines). For most farms with significant water rights endowments, a 10% canal
efficiency improvement increases water supply by about 5%, both in normal and in dry years. Farmers
with no or a very low share of legalized water rights face more complex impacts: The small stratum
that benefits overproportionally from using canal losses may even be impacted negatively by canal
improvements, especially in dry years where surplus water generation is lower. Parameter sensitivity
experiments show that this effect increases with smaller βc and also with larger λc .
The overall impact on water availability ∆T i on an individual agent i can thus be decomposed into
three components, each of which fluctuates over time: (1) the increased delivery of river water ∆Li
because of improved conductive efficiency; (2) the increased overall availability of non-attributed
water because those agents that already received excess water now leave even more surplus water ∆Si
in the canals once these are improved; (3) the decrease of non-attributed water because canal losses
that originally produced non-attributed water ∆Ci are now eliminated.
∆T i (t) = ∆Li (t) + ∆Si (t) − ∆Ci (t)
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Specialized small farms (3.5-5 ha)

Small farms (5-25 ha)

Medium farms (25-60 ha)

Large farms (>60 ha)

Figure 3: The effect of 10% canal efficiency improvements (x-axis), graphed as distribution functions
for a population of farmers normalized to 1 (y-axis). Farmers are grouped by their farm stratum (box)
and the share of irrigation water they receive through legalized water rights (lines). Full lines represent
a moderately dry year, the dotted lines a hydrologically representative year.
4

D ISCUSSION

Perhaps the most important result is that agricultural land use can only be simulated consistently if
informal mechanisms such as the allocation of non-attributed water as a source for irrigation is taken
into account. However, for such informal water management arrangements and practices, data scarcity
exists and it may not be feasible to quantify these through measurements. Thus, all results presented
here are merely a qualitative demonstration of how access to non-attributed water, as abandoned or
informally shared water and canal losses, may impact farmers. Processes such as water endowments,
canal infrastructure, the hydro-meteorological condition, the distribution of water rights across a sector, and the behaviour of others together form the environment in which less endowed farmers must
make a living. These processes sometimes function counter-intuitively.
From the policy viewpoint, this model confirms that canal improvements are beneficial to most farmers, especially to those that own water rights and are thus represented in water user associations. However, it also shows that many other farmers may be negatively impacted by improved infrastructure.
Furthermore, it offers a direct explanation of why user organizations with many small water rights
holders are not eager to improve their infrastructure: it could jeopardize the informal arrangements
that benefit many.
The proposed model also reproduces Donoso’s observation of spillover use [2006] quantitatively, using very simple assumptions. From the integrated modeling viewpoint, the existence and relevance
of non-attributed water was never a research objective. However, with analysis of both the hydrological water availability and farm-level data, the hydrological model and the economic model could not
be reconciled with empirical data. This necessitated the broadening of the scope of analysis and the
assessment of every process along the cause-effect chain. With validated water rights registries and
other strong empirical data, integration across disciplines pointed to the dominant relevance of this
interaction. This interaction may also explain why farmers are willing to engage in canal efficiency
projects, which feeds back on this interaction process.
This paper identified another knowledge gap: As production input, non-attributed water fluctuates
even stronger than ‘legalized’ water supply. The existing adaptive learning model performed relatively poorly, and many farmers had negative outcomes as a result of severe planning mistakes –

Arnold et al. /Integrated Modeling of Access to Water

particularly commercial farm agents that invested heavily, based on short-sighted expectations (Figure 2(a)). However it is during drought conditions when conflicts between farmers are severe and
local extension workers pointed out to us that informal arrangements become the cause of litigation
between neighbors.
5

C ONCLUSION

Empirically, this paper underlines that the Chilean model of privatized water rights is complex and
must be assessed within its local context, in this case the Maule region. Informal arrangements may
be as important as the legally prescribed water rights and management regime, especially for small,
traditional farmers as the rural poor. Water access related to these informal arrangements may be
an important reason why farmers support the improvement of canal infrastructure, which can benefit
those with legalized water more than those without.
Methodologically, the integrated analysis elucidated an agent-to-agent feedback mechanism by extending assessment across a long chain of causes and effects. The interactions ‘between disciplines’
were especially relevant for poorer segments of the population that benefit over proportionally from a
niche of informal arrangements. This only became apparent with a disaggregated analysis, combining
a multi-agent model with detailed data on water endowments.
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Vigilancia Rio Longavi, Chile, Dec 2005.
Lopez, R. and G. Anriquez. Chile. In Beyond food production: the role of agriculture in poverty
reduction, pages 57–82, Rome, 2007. FAO.
Schulla, J. and K. Jasper. Model description wasim-eth, new version. Internal report, IAC, ETH
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